Burdens of Proposing: On the Burden of Proof in Deliberation Dialogues

This paper considers the probative burdens of proposing action or policy options in deliberation dialogues. Do proposers bear a burden of proof? Building on pioneering work by Douglas Walton (2010), and following on a growing literature within computer science, the prevailing answer seems to be "No." Instead, only recommenders-agents who put forward an option as the one to be taken-bear a burden of proof. Against this view, we contend that proposers have burdens of proof with respect to their proposals. Specifically, we argue that, while recommenders that Phi bear a burden of proof to show that square Phi (We should / ought to / must Phi), proposers that Phi have a burden of proof to show that lozenge Phi (We may / can Phi). A burden of proposing may be defined as , which reads: Those who propose that we might Phi are obliged, if called upon, to show that Phi is possible in any of four ways which we call worldly, deontic, instrumental, and practical. So understood, burdens of proposing satisfy the standard formal definition of burden of proof.