The combined effect of perspective-taking and incentives on professional skepticism

Purpose - This paper aims to investigate the combined effect of two interventions, perspective taking and incentives, on auditors' professional skepticism (hereafter skepticism) when auditing complex estimates. Specifically, this paper examines the different ways that perspective taking (management versus inspector) and incentives (absent versus reward versus penalty) combine to impact skepticism. Design/methodology/approach - This paper uses an experiment with 177 experienced Big 4 auditors. The experiment used a 2 (management vs inspector perspective) x 3 (absent vs reward vs penalty incentives) between-subjects design. Findings - In the absence of incentives, adopting a management perspective raises situational skepticism when measuring skepticism as appropriateness of management's fair value estimate while adopting an inspector perspective raises situational skepticism when measuring skepticism as need for more evidence. The authors find some evidence that incentives complement perspective-taking by enhancing those aspects of skepticism for which perspective-taking performs poorly. When assessing management assumptions, auditors adopting an inspector perspective enhance their skepticism more substantially than those adopting a management perspective, and this enhancement is greater with rewards than with penalties. However, this study does not detect an interaction between incentive type and perspective-raking on auditor skepticism in relation to gathering additional evidence. Originality/value - This paper extends the literature by shifting the focus from a single perspective to a comparison of two perspective-raking approaches and discusses how each of these approaches enhances different aspects of skepticism. This paper also illustrates the importance of the interplay between perspective-taking and incentives in enhancing auditor skepticism.