Network-Constrained Energy Consumption Game for Dynamic Pricing Markets

The electricity distribution network is experiencing a profound transformation with the concept of the smart grid,providing possibilities for selfish consumers to interact with the distribution system operator(DSO)and to maximize their individual energy consumption utilities.However,this profit-seeking behavior among consumers may violate the network constraints,such as line flows,transformer capacity and bus voltage magnitude limits.Therefore,a network-constrained en-ergy consumption(NCEC)game among active load aggregators(ALAs)is proposed to guarantee the safety of the distribution network.The temporal and spatial constraints of an ALA are both considered,which leads the formulated model to a generalized Nash equilibrium problem(GNEP).By resorting to a well-developed variational inequality(Ⅵ)theory,we study the existence of solutions to the NCEC game problem.Subse-quently,a two-level distributed algorithm is proposed to find the variational equilibrium(VE),a fair and stable solution to the formulated game model.Finally,the effectiveness of the proposed game model and the efficiency of the distributed algorithm are tested on an IEEE-33 bus system.