Imagination and Inseparability of Soul and Body in Aristotle

In De Anima Aristotle claims that every affection of the soul seems to be an affection of the body as well. The only possible exception is reason which may be a faculty of the soul that does not require the physical body. This would mean that reasoning is independent of the body. But Aristotle also says that if reasoning requires imagination, which is a faculty of the soul that requires the body, then reasoning also requires the body. The most pressing issue, then, in interpreting Aristotle’s views about the separability of mind and body is deciding whether or not reasoning requires imagination. Contrary to the impression left by some of his statements, Aristotle has an argument that ties mind and body: rational agency requires the imagination which is in turn necessarily embodied. First I invoke Miller's useful definition of inseparablility and explain the argument, which one can find in Aristotle, for inseparability. The mind's power to sort the content of the imagination may suffice for conceptualization, even Aristotle glimpses this. But I cannot settle the question of how to cope with Aristotle's contending assertions and content myself with outlining a path perhaps not taken.