Patronage And Money. Closure Mechanisms In The Appointment Of Chairs Using The Example Of A Scientific Subdiscipline In Germany

In the light of the increasing political influence on German universities (amongst others, the excellence initiative) with effects on the selection of top positions, this article examines the appointment of chairs (department heads) in a "small" surgical specialty during the last 30 years. Following the delineation of official indicators of competence (inclusion criteria) within an appointment procedure, it can be shown that a broad distribution of institutions and persons that meet these criteria exists. The empirical examination of the actually successful occupations shows that closure mechanisms play a role because the successful candidates stem from no more than 10 out of 34 clinical departments. The monetary capital in terms of third-party funds is the most important allocation criterion, but cannot sufficiently explain the way appointments take place. As there are candidates who in formal terms are in a wide measure equally qualified, and a consequential uncertainty of the basis of decision within an appointment procedure, the derivation of the candidate in terms of a personal relationship to a chair holder (department head) from whose clinic he applies and who acts as a patron, proves to be the decisive distinction following the examination of all inclusion criteria. This results in a reproduction of the chair holders (department heads) largely from the same clinical departments and the formation of an academic caste system. In perspective, this cartel-like closure appears to be getting increasingly worse.