Does The Board'S On-Site Decision Inhibit Over-Investment

Xiaofei Shi,Fei Zhao,Long Xu, Na Bian, Fengfei Wang

PLOS ONE(2021)

引用 0|浏览1
暂无评分
摘要
It is an effective expansion of the research on the Board of Directors to do the research based on different board meeting forms and their effects sampling A-share companies listed in 2007-2017, the article empirically tests the impact of the times of board meetings, the proportion of on-site board meetings on listed companies' over-investment. Consequently and significantly, the times of board meetings is positively correlated with over-investment, while the proportion of on-site board meetings is negatively correlated with over-investment. That is, the on-site meeting for the Board decision-making will better inhibit the enterprises' over-investment behaviors. Further research shows that when there is a controlling shareholder in the company or in a dual position, the on-site board meeting no longer has a significant inhibitory effect on over-investment. By research on the independence of the Board of Directors, it is found that when selecting on-site board decision-making, the existence of independent directors has an over-investment suppression effect, and the higher the proportion of independent directors, the more obvious the inhibitory effect is. The samples are divided into state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, the study found that when choosing on-site board meetings, state-owned enterprises have a greater inhibitory effect on over-investment than private enterprises. The findings of this study will enrich the research of the board meeting and provide a new testing method for the relevant research of the Board of Directors.
更多
查看译文
AI 理解论文
溯源树
样例
生成溯源树,研究论文发展脉络
Chat Paper
正在生成论文摘要