Societal Preferences For The Treatment Of Impulsive-Violent Offenders: A Discrete Choice Experiment

ObjectivesThe aim of this study is to quantify societal preferences for, and assess trade-offs between characteristics of treatment programmes for impulsive-violent offenders.SettingThe study was conducted in New South Wales, Australia's largest state.ParticipantsThe study participants were income tax payers, aged over 18 and who were able to provide informed consent.MethodsA discrete choice experiment was used to assess the preferences for treatment programmes for impulsive violent offenders. The survey presented participants with six choice sets in which they chose between two unlabelled treatment scenarios and a 'no treatment' choice. A random parameters logistic (RPL) model and a latent class (LC) model were used to analyse the societal preferences for treatment and estimate willingness to pay values based on marginal rates of substitution. Respondents were asked to self-identify if they ever had experiences with violence and subgroup analysis was done.ResultsThe survey was completed by 1021 highly engaged participants. The RPL model showed that society had a preference for more effective programmes, programmes that provided full as opposed to partial treatment of all co-occurring health conditions, compulsory over voluntary programmes, those with flexibility in appointments and programmes that are provided with continuity of care postprison. Respondents were willing to pay an additional annual tax contribution for all significant attributes, particularly compulsory programmes, continuity of treatment and effectiveness.The LC model identified two classes of respondents with some differences in preferences which could be largely identified by whether they had experiences with violence or not.ConclusionThe results are important for future programme design and implementation. Programmes for impulsive violent offenders that are designed to encompass societal preferences are likely to be supported by public and tax payers.