Public Goods Game With The Interdependence Of Different Cooperative Strategies

This paper proposes a public goods game (PGG) of two cooperative strategies with different quantities of input cost: the strategy with a higher quantity of input cost is labeled as quasi-cooperation, while that with lower input cost is labeled as quasi-defection. In an ideal classless society, the two strategies are independent, as in the classical PGG; however, in a more realistic class society, they are interdependent. On this basis, two models (An-PGG and In-PGG) are built to respectively describe the two class scenarios. The results for the An-PGG demonstrate that, to promote the quasi-cooperation, the quasi-defective cost should be reduced. The results for the In-PGG indicate that, the closer the two types of input are, the smaller is the difference between the proportions of the two strategies in the system, hence the more ef-fective are the inputs and the greater is the economic benefit. The indispensability of the quasi-defection in an interdependence mechanism sometimes brings to the system more quasi-cooperative agents. The class system is more advantageous than the classless system when the synergy factor and the quasi-defective degree are too small.(c) 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.