Managerial Centrality and Shared Growth: Evidence from Korean Service Corporations' Financial Records

JOURNAL OF ASIAN FINANCE ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS(2020)

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摘要
This paper focused on the level of managerial centralization on chief executive officer (CEO) as a factor to affect the shared growth activities of corporate. As service corporations are becoming active in shared growth activities recently, this paper thus used CEO. Pay Slice (CPS) information to measure the level of managerial centralization on CEO of service corporation and tested the influence of the level of managerial centralization on whether shared growth activities are executed and the level of such activities respectively. The result of test shows that companies with high managerial centralization on CEO are more passive toward shared growth activities than those without such centralization. This can be interpreted that a CEO with more powerful influence may consider shared growth activities as to be negative and take a passive attitude to them. On the other hand, such result was supported by additional analysis with companies committing shared growth activities as well. This paper is expected to contribute to bring about interest on shared growth activities as the gap between major companies and small and medium sized companies is currently expanding in terms of operating profit ratio and even salary of employees.
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关键词
CEO Pay Slice,Financial Data,Managerial Centrality,Service Corporations,Shared Growth
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