Evolutionary Game Theory Squared: Evolving Agents in Endogenously Evolving Zero-Sum Games

Stratis Skoulakis
Stratis Skoulakis
Tanner Fiez
Tanner Fiez
Ryann Sim
Ryann Sim
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We show that systems in which populations of dynamic agents interact with environments that evolve as a function of the agents themselves can equivalently be modeled as polymatrix games

Abstract:

The predominant paradigm in evolutionary game theory and more generally online learning in games is based on a clear distinction between a population of dynamic agents that interact given a fixed, static game. In this paper, we move away from the artificial divide between dynamic agents and static games, to introduce and analyze a large...More
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