Resilient Cooperative Voltage Control For Distribution Network With High Penetration Distributed Energy Resources

This paper considers the problem of designing a resilient distributed voltage control algorithm for distribution systems with high penetration of distributed energy resources in the presence of an unknown cyber-attack. The purpose of the attack is to force the system to violate the operating voltage limit by intercepting its communication channels and inserting exogenous signals to perturb and/or modify the information being exchanged. We first review the cooperative voltage control proposed in our previous work and provide a new stability analysis for it. Next, we present a resilient cooperative voltage control algorithm by introducing a virtual system interconnected with the original system such that the voltage can be maintained within the operational limit under unknown attacks. The resiliency of the proposed algorithm is demonstrated via simulations on the IEEE 8500-node system when subjected to an attack which consists of corrupting the data being exchanged in the communication network between two generation units.