Sequential Agenda Setting with Näıve or Sophisticated Voters and Uncertainty ∗

We study sequential votes on proposals in two-period environments. If the first proposal is rejected, a second proposal is made; if both proposals are rejected, the status quo prevails. We use a 2x2 design that distinguishes the environments. Voters can be näıve or sophisticated; the electorate in the second period can be the same as in the first period or different. A risk-neutral agenda Setter has incomplete information about Voter preferences. Voters have quadratic loss. We identify environments with policy adjustment (different proposals in the two periods) and environments with no policy adjustment (identical proposals in the two periods). We identify environments where the Setter learns from a rejection and uses the information to tailor the second period proposal. Importantly, sophistication often limits, or entirely obviates, the Setter’s ability to exploit the opportunity to make two proposals. Results complement the work of Romer and Rosenthal (1979) on näıve Voters.