Incentive Mechanism for Edge Computing-based Blockchain

IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics(2020)

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摘要
Blockchain has been gradually applied to different Internet-of-Things platforms. As the efficiency of the blockchain mainly depends on the network computing capability, how to make sure the acquisition of the computational resources and participation of the devices would be the driving force. In this article, we focus on investigating incentive mechanism for rational miners to purchase the computational resources. An edge-computing-based blockchain network is considered, where the edge service provider (ESP) can provide computational resources for the miners. Accordingly, we formulate a two-stage Stackelberg game between the miners and ESP. The aim is to investigate SE of the optimal mining strategy under the two different mining schemes, in order to find the optimal incentive for the ESP and miners to choose autofit strategies. Through theoretical analysis and numerical simulations, we can demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme on encouraging devices to participate the blockchain.
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关键词
Blockchain,computing,hash power,mining,Nash equilibrium (NE),optimal incentive,reporting,reward
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