Does State Ownership Hurt or Help Minority Shareholders
Global Strategy Journal(2018)
摘要
We argue that state ownership is a crucial policy instrument for alleviating what is perhaps the
most important principal-principal (PP) agency problem around the globe: private benefits of
control (PBC). Our results illustrate that states reduce PBC in the companies in which they
acquire controlling ownership positions. We also examine how legal and political institutions
influence the extent to which states accomplish this goal. Anti-self-dealing legal regulations
make states more effective in their efforts to constrain PBC, while political constraints make
them less effective. Regimes with high state capacity appear not to prioritize PBC reduction. We
test and corroborate these ideas in a sample of 1,354 control transactions across 54 countries.
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