Simple, Credible, and Approximately-Optimal Auctions

Fishelson Maxwell
Fishelson Maxwell
Velusamy Santhoshini
Velusamy Santhoshini

EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Virtual Event Hungary July, 2020, pp. 7132020.

Cited by: 1|Views32
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Abstract:

We present a general framework for designing approximately revenue-optimal mechanisms for multi-item additive auctions. Our approach adapts the duality framework of Cai, Devanur and Weinberg (STOC 2016) and applies to both truthful and non-truthful auctions. Given a (not necessarily truthful) single-item auction format 'A' satisfying cert...More

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