Approximation Schemes for a Unit-Demand Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries

Sahil Singla
Sahil Singla
Divyarthi Mohan
Divyarthi Mohan
Ariel Schvartzman
Ariel Schvartzman

2019 IEEE 60TH ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM ON FOUNDATIONS OF COMPUTER SCIENCE (FOCS 2019), pp. 220.0-232, 2019.

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Abstract:

We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with n items facing a single buyer. We introduce the notion of symmetric menu complexity of a mechanism, which counts the number of distinct options the buyer may purchase, up to permutations of the items. Our main result is that a mechanism of quasi-polynomial symmetric menu complexity suffices to ...More

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