Settling the Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Two Subadditive Buyers
2019 IEEE 60th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS)(2019)
摘要
We study the communication complexity of welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions with m items and two players with subadditive valuations. We show that outperforming the trivial 1/2-approximation requires exponential communication, settling an open problem of Dobzinski, Nisan and Schapira [STOC’05, MOR’10] and Feige [STOC’06, SICOMP ’09]. To derive our results, we introduce a new class of subadditive functions that are “far from” fractionally subadditive (XOS) functions, and establish randomized communication lower bounds for a new “near-EQUALITY” problem, both of which may be of independent interest.
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关键词
communication complexity,combinatorial auctions,subadditive functions
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