Securely Trading Unverifiable Information without Trust.

arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory(2019)

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摘要
future, information may become one of the most important assets in economy. However, unlike common goods (e.g. clothing), information is troublesome in trading since the information commodities are emph{vulnerable}, as they lose their values immediately after revelation, and possibly unverifiable, as they can be subjective. By authorizing a trusted center (e.g. Amazon) to help manage the information trade, traders are ``forcedu0027u0027 to give the trusted center the ability to become an information monopolist. To this end, we need a trust-free (i.e. without a trusted center and with only strategic traders) unverifiable information trade protocol such that it 1) motivates the sellers to provide high quality information, and the buyer to pay for the information with a fair price (truthful); 2) except the owner, the information is known only to its buyer if the trade is executed (secure). In an unverifiable information trade scenario (e.g. a medical company wants to buy expertsu0027 opinions on multiple difficult medical images with unknown pathological truth from several hospitals), we design a trust-free, truthful, and secure protocol, Smart Info-Dealer (SMind), for information trading, by borrowing three cutting-edge tools that include peer prediction, secure multi-party computation, and smart contract. With SMind, without a trusted center, a seller with high-quality information is able to sell her information securely at a fair price and those with low-quality information cannot earn extra money with poor information or steal information from other sellers. We believe SMind will help describe a free and secure information trade scenario in the future.
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