The Stackelberg Game Bidding Strategy Of Chp Units In District Integrated Heat And Power Grid

Combined heat and power unit (CHP) contributes to the improvement of energy efficiency. The investigation of CHPs' bidding strategy is meaningful to the profit maximization of CHPs in the district integrated heat and power grid (DIHPG). Stackelberg game model is used to analyze the problem. To derive the price difference in the district heat grid (DHG) and district power grid (DPG), locational marginal heat price (LMHP) and locational marginal electricity price (LMEP) are calculated. The spatial characteristics of LMHPs are explained by the proposed bidirectional heat loss theory. The optimal bidding strategies of CHPs and optimal demands of power market and heat market are calculated by the best response algorithm. The result proves the existence of Nash equilibrium in the Stackelberg game. CHP's optimal bidding prices of power should be equal to the LMEPs of its connected nodes with DPG and CHP's optimal bidding prices of heat should be equal to the LMHPs of its connected nodes with DHG.