The finite horizon, undiscounted, durable goods monopoly problem with finitely many consumers
Journal of Mathematical Economics(2019)
摘要
We study the uncommitted durable goods monopoly problem when there are finitely many consumers, a finite horizon, and no discounting. In particular we characterize the set of strong-Markov subgame perfect equilibria that satisfy the skimming property. We show that in any such equilibrium the profits are not less than static monopoly profits; and at most the static monopoly profits plus the monopoly price. When each consumer is small relative to the market, profits are then approximately the same as those of a static monopolist which sets a single price. Finally, we extend the equilibrium characterization to games with an arbitrary discount factor.
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关键词
Durable goods monopoly,Discrete buyers,Profit bounds,Inter-temporal price discrimination,Skimming property
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