Beyond agency: sources of knowing and learning in children’s science- and technology-related problem solving

In (science) education, primacy is given to agency, the human capability to act and, in this, to learn. However, phenomenological philosophers and societal-historical psychologists point out that agency, the purposeful (intentional) engagement with the world, is only the effect of a much more profound capacity: passibility, the capacity to be affected. In this study, we begin with what has been recognized as a fundamental condition of learning: learners cannot intentionally orient to the learning outcome because they inherently do not know it so that that knowledge cannot be the object of intention. In this study, we provide evidence for three empirically grounded assertions: (a) children do not intend new knowledge and understanding, which instead give themselves in and through materials and material configurations; (b) knowing-how is received (as unintended gifts) because our bodies are endowed with passibility, the capability to be affected; and (c) the new knowledge and understanding exists as and in social relation first. We suggest implications for engineering design in science classrooms.