Reframing Threat Detection: Inside esINSIDER.

M. Arthur Munson, Jason Kichen,Dustin Hillard,Ashley Fidler, Peiter Zatko

arXiv: Cryptography and Security(2019)

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摘要
We describe the motivation and design for esINSIDER, an automated tool that detects potential persistent and insider threats in a network. esINSIDER aggregates clues from log data, over extended time periods, and proposes a small number of cases for human experts to review. The proposed cases package together related information so the analyst can see a bigger picture of what is happening, and their evidence includes internal network activity resembling reconnaissance and data collection. The core ideas are to 1) detect fundamental campaign behaviors by following data movements over extended time periods, 2) link together behaviors associated with different meta-goals, and 3) use machine learning to understand what activities are expected and consistent for each individual network. We call this approach campaign analytics because it focuses on the threat actoru0027s campaign goals and the intrinsic steps to achieve them. Linking different campaign behaviors (internal reconnaissance, collection, exfiltration) reduces false positives from business-as-usual activities and creates opportunities to detect threats before a large exfiltration occurs. Machine learning makes it practical to deploy this approach by reducing the amount of tuning needed.
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