Quantitative Analysis of Timing Channel Security in Cryptographic Hardware Design.

Baolei Mao,Wei Hu,Alric Althoff,Janarbek Matai,Yu Tai,Dejun Mu,Timothy Sherwood,Ryan Kastner

IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems（2018）

引用 22|浏览56

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摘要

Cryptographic cores are known to leak information about their private key due to runtime variations, and there are many well-known attacks that can exploit this timing channel. In this paper, we study how information theoretic measures can quantify the amount of key leakage that can be exacted from runtime measurements. We develop and analyze 22 Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) hardware designs-each wi...

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关键词

Timing,Cryptography,Hardware,Runtime,Algorithm design and analysis

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