A Simple Market Mechanism for Renewable Power Producers Achieves Asymptotic Social Efficiency.
IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing（2018）
摘要
A price-making two-settlement power market where both conventional generators and renewable power producers (RPPs) participate is studied. It is proved that, as the number of RPPs increases, the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the market converges to the social optimum. As a result, social efficiency is asymptotically achieved with a simple market mechanism for integrating RPPs, without the need for an independent system operator (ISO) to perform a centralized stochastic optimization.
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关键词
simple market mechanism,renewable power producers,asymptotic social efficiency,price-making two-settlement power market,conventional generators,RPPs increases,social optimum,integrating RPPs,Nash equilibrium,NE,independent system operator,ISO,centralized stochastic optimization
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