Imprecise Bayesianism and Global Belief Inertia

BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE(2018)

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Abstract
Traditional Bayesianism requires that an agent's degrees of belief be represented by a real-valued, probabilistic credence function. However, in many cases it seems that our evidence is not rich enough to warrant such precision. In light of this, some have proposed that we instead represent an agent's degrees of belief as a set of credence functions. This way, we can respect the evidence by requiring that the set, often called the agent's credal state, includes all credence functions that are in some sense compatible with the evidence. One known problem for this evidentially motivated imprecise view is that in certain cases, our imprecise credence in a particular proposition will remain the same no matter how much evidence we receive. In this article I argue that the problem is much more general than has been appreciated so far, and that it's difficult to avoid it without compromising the initial evidentialist motivation.
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Key words
inertia,global
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