Humanitarian Funding in a Multi-Donor Market with Donation Uncertainty

This study analyzes the trade-off between funding strategies and operational performance in humanitarian operations. If a Humanitarian Organization (HO) offers donors the option of earmarking their donations, HO should expect an increase in total donations. However, earmarking creates constraints in resource allocation that negatively affect HO's operational performance. We study this trade-off from the perspective of a single HO that maximizes its expected utility as a function of total donations and operational performance. HO implements disaster response and development programs and it operates in a multi-donor market with donation uncertainty. Using a model inspired by Scarf's minimax approach and the newsvendor framework, we analyze the strategic interaction between HO and its donors. The numerical section is based on real data from 15 disasters during the period 2012-2013. We find that poor operational performance has a larger effect on HO's utility function when donors are more uncertain about HO's expected needs for disaster response. Interestingly, increasing the public awareness of development programs helps HO to get more non-earmarked donations for disaster response. Increasing non-earmarked donations improves HO's operational efficiency, which mitigates the impact of donation uncertainty on HO's utility function.