Adaptive control‐theoretic detection of integrity attacks against cyber‐physical industrial systems

AbstractAbstractThe use of control‐theoretic solutions to detect attacks against cyber‐physical industrial systems is a growing area of research. Traditional literature proposes the use of control strategies to retain, eg, satisfactory close‐loop performance, as well as safety properties, when a communication network connects the distributed components of a physical system (eg, sensors, actuators, and controllers). However, the adaptation of these strategies to handle security incidents is an ongoing challenge. In this paper, we survey the advantages of a watermark‐based detector against some integrity attacks as well as the weaknesses against other attacks. To cover these weaknesses, we propose a new control and security strategy that complements the watermark‐based detector. We validate the detection efficiency of the new strategy via numeric simulation. Experimental results are also presented by using a laboratory testbed based on supervisory control and data acquisition industrial protocols. View Figure In this paper, we survey the advantages of a watermark‐based detector against some integrity attacks as well as the weaknesses against other attacks. To cover these weaknesses, we propose a new control and security strategy that complements the watermark‐based detector. We validate the detection efficiency of the new strategy via numeric simulation. Experimental results are also presented by using a laboratory testbed based on supervisory control and data acquisition industrial protocols.