Cryptanalysis Of Aes-Prf And Its Dual
IACR TRANSACTIONS ON SYMMETRIC CRYPTOLOGY(2018)
摘要
A dedicated pseudorandom function (PRF) called AES-PRF was proposed by Mennink and Neves at FSE 2018 (ToSC 2017, Issue 3). AES-PRF is obtained from AES by using the output of the 5-th round as the feed-forward to the output state. This paper presents extensive security analysis of AES-PRF and its variants. Specifically, we consider unbalanced variants where the output of the s-th round is used as the feed-forward. We also analyze the security of "dual" constructions of the unbalanced variants, where the input state is used as the feed-forward to the output of the s-th round. We apply an impossible differential attack, zero-correlation linear attack, traditional differential attack, zero correlation linear distinguishing attack and a meet-in-the-middle attack on these PRFs and reduced round versions. We show that AES-PRF is broken whenever a <= 2 or s >= 6, or reduced to 7 rounds, and Dual-AES-PRF is broken whenever s <= 4 or s >= 8. Our results on AES-PRF improve the initial security evaluation by the designers in various ways, and our results on Dual-AES-PRF give the first insight to its security.
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关键词
AES-PRF, Dual-AES-PRF, Impossible differential, Zero-correlation linear, Meet-in-the-middle
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