Robust Mediators in Large Games.
arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory(2015)
摘要
A mediator is a mechanism that can only suggest actions to players, as a function of all agentsu0027 reported types, in a given game of incomplete information. We study what is achievable by two kinds of mediators, and weak. Players can choose to opt-out of using a strong mediator but cannot misrepresent their type if they opt-in. Such a mediator is because we can view it as having the ability to verify player types. Weak mediators lack this ability--- players are free to misrepresent their type to a weak mediator. We show a striking result---in a prior-free setting, assuming only that the game is large and players have private types, strong mediators can implement approximate equilibria of the complete-information game. If the game is a congestion game, then the same result holds using only weak mediators. Our result follows from a novel application of differential privacy, in particular, a variant we propose called joint differential privacy.
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