Affine Maximizers in Domains with Selfish Valuations.
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation(2015)
摘要
We consider the domain of selfish and continuous preferences over a “rich” allocation space and show that onto, strategyproof and allocation non-bossy social choice functions are affine maximizers. Roberts [1979] proves this result for a finite set of alternatives and an unrestricted valuation space. In this article, we show that in a subdomain of the unrestricted valuations with the additional assumption of allocation non-bossiness , using the richness of the allocations, the strategyproof social choice functions can be shown to be affine maximizers. We provide an example to show that allocation non-bossiness is indeed critical for this result. This work shows that an affine maximizer result needs a certain amount of richness split across valuations and allocations.
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关键词
Selfish valuations,affine maximizer,allocation non-bossiness,characterization,social choice function,strategyproofness
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