Evaluating the Performance of Non-Bayesian Regulatory Mechanisms
Journal of Regulatory Economics(1996)
摘要
This paper compares the performance of two prominent non-Bayesian regulatory mechanisms: Sappington and Sibley's (1988) Incremental Surplus Subsidy (ISS) and Hagerman's (1990) refinement of the Vogelsang-Finsinger (1979) mechanism. The two mechanisms are shown to induce identical, non-zero levels of “abuse”—unproductive expenses that benefit the firm—though neither induces pure waste. ISS pareto-dominates the Hagerman mechanism when lump-sum transfers to the firm are non-distortionary, but the Hagerman mechanism generates greater welfare and consumer surplus when the distortionary effects of transfers are large. For a wide range of intermediate parameter values, the quantitative difference in performance between the two mechanisms is surprisingly modest.
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关键词
economic model,consumer surplus,economic models
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