The Price Of Anarchy In Large Games
STOC(2016)
摘要
We present an analysis framework for bounding the price of anarchy (POA) in games that have many players, as in many of the games most pertinent to computer science applications. We use this framework to demonstrate that, in many of the models in which the POA has been studied, the POA in large games is much smaller than the worst-case bound. Our framework also differentiates between mechanisms with similar worst-case performance, such as simultaneous uniform-price auctions and greedy combinatorial auctions, thereby providing new insights about which mechanisms are likely to perform well in realistic settings.
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关键词
Price of Anarchy,Large games,Smoothness,Combinatorial auctions
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