LIVE: Lightweight Integrity Verification and Content Access Control for Named Data Networking

IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security(2015)

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摘要
Named data networking (NDN) is a new paradigm for the future Internet wherein interest and data packets carry content names rather than the current IP paradigm of source and destination addresses. Security is built into NDN by embedding a public key signature in each data packet to enable verification of authenticity and integrity of the content. However, existing heavyweight signature generation and verification algorithms prevent universal integrity verification among NDN nodes, which may result in content pollution and denial of service attacks. Furthermore, caching and location-independent content access disables the capability of a content provider to control content access, e.g., who can cache a content and which end user or device can access it. We propose a lightweight integrity verification (LIVE) architecture, an extension to the NDN protocol, to address these two issues seamlessly. LIVE enables universal content signature verification in NDN with lightweight signature generation and verification algorithms. Furthermore, it allows a content provider to control content access in NDN nodes by selectively distributing integrity verification tokens to authorized nodes. We evaluate the effectiveness of LIVE with open source CCNx project. Our paper shows that LIVE only incurs average 10% delay in accessing contents. Compared with traditional public key signature schemes, the verification delay is reduced by over 20 times in LIVE.
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