Top-Management-Teams' Compensation Packages
msra(2008)
摘要
The purpose of this work is to study on compensation packages for top management teams. The analysis focuses on the annual pay plus change in equity portfolio value, how its level, pay-performance sensibility and structure vary across managerial categories, and the impact of these variations on corporate performance. Using a multilevel mixed-model approach on 589 companies from the S&P 1500 between 1998 and 2005, the evidence shows that CEO compensation packages are not isomorphic to those of non-CEO executives, while on average no significant differences are found between divisional and corporate executives. Despite this, the random effects show that differences between two categories vary across companies, with shareholder return been lower for companies where differences between corporate and divisional managers are greater.
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关键词
performance,divisional firms,incentives,executives
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