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This paper describes a general approach to constructing cooperative services spanning multiple administrative domains in the context of a cooperative backup system
BAR fault tolerance for cooperative services
SOSP, no. 5 (2005): 45-58
This paper describes a general approach to constructing cooperative services that span multiple administrative domains. In such environments, protocols must tolerate both Byzantine behaviors when broken, misconfigured, or malicious nodes arbitrarily deviate from their specification and rational behaviors when selfish nodes deviate from th...More
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- This paper describes a general approach to constructing cooperative services that span multiple administrative domains (MADs).
- Nodes collaborate to provide some service that benefits each node, but there is no central authority that controls the nodes’ actions.
- Models that only account for selfish behavior  handle the second class of deviations, but may be vulnerable to arbitrary disruptions if even a single node is broken and deviates from expected rational behavior
- This paper describes a general approach to constructing cooperative services that span multiple administrative domains (MADs)
- The Byzantine model classifies all deviations as faults and requires a bound on the number of faults in the system; this bound is not tenable in MAD systems where all nodes may benefit from selfish behavior and be motivated to deviate from the protocol
- Our microbenchmarks show that our replicated state machine (RSM) prototype can perform about 15 operations a second, an adequate level of performance for our application’s requirements
- Our work addresses the new challenges that arise in MAD distributed systems, where the Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) safety requirement that fewer than one third of the nodes deviate from the assigned protocol can be violated
- This paper describes a general approach to constructing cooperative services spanning MADs in the context of a cooperative backup system
- Experiments run on Pentium-IV machines with 2.4 Ghz processors, 1 GB of memory, and Debian Linux 3.0.
- These are shared machines, connected through 100 Mbps ethernet.
- The Emulab  experiments were run on Pentium-III machines with 850 Mhz processors, 256 Mb of RAM, and Red Hat Linux 9.
- The authors use the BouncyCastle cryptographic library and Onion Networks’ FEC library for erasure coding
- The authors evaluate the replicated state machine and BAR-B prototype.
- The authors' microbenchmarks show that the RSM prototype can perform about 15 operations a second, an adequate level of performance for the application’s requirements.
- The authors evaluate the performance of the BAR-B application.
- The authors find that the nonoptimized BAR-B prototype can back up 100 MB of data to 10 nodes in under 4 minutes and guarantee that the data are recoverable despite the failure of 3 nodes
- This paper describes a general approach to constructing cooperative services spanning MADs in the context of a cooperative backup system.
- The three primary contributions of this paper are (1) the introduction of the BAR (Byzantine, Altruistic, and Rational) model, (2) a general architecture for building services in the BAR model, and (3) an application of this general architecture to build BAR-B, the first cooperative backup service to tolerate both Byzantine users and an unbounded number of rational users
- Our work brings together Byzantine fault-tolerance and game theory.
Byzantine agreement  and Byzantine fault tolerant state machine replication have been studied in both theoretical and practical settings [6, 9, 26, 49, 55]. Our work is clearly indebted to recent research [2, 10, 36, 53, 63] that has shown how BFT can be practical in distributed systems that fall under a single administrative domain—indeed, Castro and Liskov’s BFT state machine  is the starting point for our IC-BFT state machine. Our work addresses the new challenges that arise in MAD distributed systems, where the BFT safety requirement that fewer than one third of the nodes deviate from the assigned protocol can be easily violated.
Game theory  has a long history in the economics literature [4, 28, 41] and has recently become of general interest in computer science [3, 20, 22, 23, 45, 48, 61]. Protocol and system designers have used game theoretic concepts to model behaviors in a variety of settings including routing [21, 58, 59], multicast , and wireless network . Common across these works is the assumption that all nodes behave rationally—the presence of a single Byzantine node may lead to a violation of the guarantees that these system intend to provide.
- This work was supported in part by NSF award CNS 0509338 and NSF CyberTrust award 0430510
- Lorenzo Alvisi was also supported by an Alfred P
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