Relay Power Allocation And Pricing In Multi-User Relay Networks Using Game Theory

This paper considers a multi-user single-relay wireless network, where the relay gets paid for helping the users forward signals, and the users pay to receive the relay service. We study the relay power allocation and pricing problem, and model the interaction between the users and the relay as a two-level Stackelberg game. In this game, the relay, modeled as the service provider and the leader of the game, sets the relay price to maximize its revenue; while the users are modeled as customers and the follower who buy power from the relay. For the relay power allocation among users, we use a bargaining game model to achieve a fair allocation. Based on the proposed fair relay power allocation rule, we then analyze the optimal relay power price that maximizes the relay's revenue, and derive the analytical solution. Simulation shows that the proposed power allocation scheme achieves a higher network sum-rate than the even power allocation, and is fairer than the sum-rate-optimal allocation. We also show that the proposed pricing and power allocation solution is consistent with the laws of supply and demand.