Can Code Polymorphism Limit Information Leakage?
WISTP'11: Proceedings of the 5th IFIP WG 11.2 international conference on Information security theory and practice: security and privacy of mobile devices in wireless communication(2011)
摘要
In addition to its usual complexity assumptions, cryptography silently assumes that information can be physically protected in a single location. As one can easily imagine, real-life devices are not ideal and information may leak through different physical side-channels. It is a known fact that information leakage is a function of both the executed code F and its input x.In this work we explore the use of polymorphic code as a way of resisting side channel attacks. We present experimental results with procedural and functional languages. In each case we rewrite the protected code code F-i before its execution. The outcome is a genealogy of programs F-0, F-1, . . . such that for all inputs x and for all indexes i not equal j double right arrow F-i(x) = F-j(x) and F-i not equal F-j. This is shown to increase resistance to side channel attacks.
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关键词
side channel attack,executed code F,polymorphic code,protected code code Fi,Fi ne,information leakage,cryptography silently,different physical side-channels,experimental result,functional language,polymorphism limit information leakage
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