Legal Remedies for Breach of the Regulatory “Contract”
Journal of Regulatory Economics(2002)
摘要
We present a model of the regulatory “contract” that focuses on the mutual investment of buyer and seller and recognizes the cost of contractual renegotiation and the importance of breach remedies when contracts are incomplete. We model renegotiation as a litigation game played before a quasi-judicial administrative court. We find that the standard contractual remedy of expectations damages cannot implement first-best levels of investment for both buyer and seller. If the seller fully recovers its sunk investment upon buyer breach, however, then first-best levels of investment by both buyer and seller can be supported provided litigation costs are small enough.
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关键词
Public Finance,Industrial Organization,Legal Remedy,Litigation Cost,Administrative Court
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