A randomized countermeasure against parasitic adversaries in wireless sensor networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications(2010)
摘要
Due to their limited capabilities, wireless sensor nodes are subject to physical attacks that are hard to defend against. In this paper, we first identify a typical attacker, called parasitic adversary, who seeks to exploit sensor networks by obtaining measurements in an unauthorized way. As a countermeasure, we first employ a randomized key refreshing: with low communication cost, it aims at confining (but not eliminating) the effects of the adversary. Moreover, our low-complexity solution, GossiCrypt, leverages on the large scale of sensor networks to protect data confidentiality, efficiently and effectively. GossiCrypt applies symmetric key encryption to data at their source nodes; and it applies re-encryption at a randomly chosen subset of nodes en route to the sink. The combination of randomized key refreshing and GossiCrypt protects data confidentiality with a probability of almost 1; we show this analytically and with simulations. In addition, the energy consumption of GossiCrypt is lower than a public-key based solution by several orders of magnitude.
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关键词
network security,large scale,sensor network,data confidentiality,data confidentiality protection,confidentiality,wireless sensor network,parasitic adversary,low communication cost,parasitic adversaries,gossicrypt,randomized key refreshing,low-complexity solution,symmetric key encryption,public key cryptography,randomized countermeasure,limited capability,energy consumption,public key encryption,wireless sensor node,probabilistic key refreshing and en-route encryption,wireless sensor networks,telecommunication security,security,silicon,public key,markov processes,protocols,encryption
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