Approximate Solutions for Partially Observable Stochastic Games with Common Payoffs

New York, NY, USA(2004)

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摘要
Partially observable decentralized decision making in robot teams is fundamentally different from decision making in fully observable problems. Team members cannot simply apply single-agent solution techniques in parallel. Instead, we must turn to game theoretic frameworks to correctly model the problem. While partially observable stochastic games (POSGs) provide a solution model for decentralized robot teams, this model quickly becomes intractable. We propose an algorithm that approximates POSGs as a series of smaller, related Bayesian games, using heuristics such as QMDP to provide the future discounted value of actions. This algorithm trades off limited look-ahead in uncertainty for computational feasibility, and results in policies that are locally optimal with respect to the selected heuristic. Empirical results are provided for both a simple problem for which the full POSG can also be constructed, as well as more complex, robot-inspired, problems.
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关键词
single-agent solution technique,observable stochastic game,algorithm trade,computational feasibility,approximate solutions,partially observable stochastic games,robot team,simple problem,decentralized robot team,solution model,observable decentralized decision,observable problem,common payoffs,presuppositions,computer science,type theory,game theory,look ahead,parallel robots,bayesian game,stochastic processes
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